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Wagyu XMR1 deployer on Hyperliquid (November 2026) hack — November 2026

Verified — 4 sourcesLast checked November 20, 2026

Incident facts

Date of incident
Publicly disclosedNovember 20, 2026
Target typeToken contract
Loss$13,510,000Price at time of incident
MethodPrivate key compromiseThe key of the account that deployed XMR1 on Hyperliquid was used to move 5.2 million XMR1 to a fresh attacker account, which sold them into the order book. Wagyu's operator says the key was taken from an old server at a hosting provider that was itself breached
ChainsOther, Arbitrum, Ethereum
OutcomeUnresolved

What happened

Early on 20 November 2026 the account that deployed XMR1, a Monero-representing token on Hyperliquid issued through the Wagyu swap and bridge service, sent 5.2 million XMR1 in three transfers between 04:46 and 05:16 UTC to an account created that morning. The new account sold 369,623 of them to 420 buyers between 04:49 and 10:28 UTC for $13.51 million, the figure here, and the price fell from about $500 to about $1. Bitquery found that the attacker's address got its first ETH from Tornado Cash eight minutes before it appeared on Hyperliquid.

The proceeds were moved to Arbitrum and swapped for ETH: Lookonchain counted 13.22 million USDC spent on 7,467 ETH (the low figure here), and Bitquery found 7,348 ETH sitting in three wallets, most of it bridged to Ethereum, at its last check. About three quarters of the $13.51 million came from buy orders already resting on the book, so market makers took most of the loss. The same deployer account still holds 99.97% of ZEC1, Wagyu's Zcash token.

Wagyu's pseudonymous operator, PerpetualCow, said swappers lost nothing and that everyone who lost money on XMR1 will be refunded by him personally, and later posted that the deployer key had been held on an old, deleted server at the hosting provider 1984.hosting, which he says was breached the same day with customers' data and server files. That account has not been independently confirmed. A promised refund is compensation, not a recovery, so the outcome stays unresolved; Wagyu says it will relaunch later.

On-chain references

Published so the figures above can be checked against the chain rather than taken from us. Victim addresses are never listed.

Attacker addresses

  • 0x1464dAcaCeB0d511f9964cDac5ebA50ea42220Bf

Sources

  1. PerpetualCow (Wagyu) on X: post-mortem (20 November 2026, 12:48 UTC)Primary · retrieved 2026-11-20
  2. PerpetualCow (Wagyu) on X: refund pledge (20 November 2026, 11:31 UTC)Primary · retrieved 2026-11-20
  3. Lookonchain on X (20 November 2026, 05:54 UTC)On-chain · retrieved 2026-11-20
  4. Bitquery investigation (20 November 2026)Secondary · retrieved 2026-11-20

Official post-mortem: https://x.com/PerpetualCow/status/2123760480061718801

Changes to this entry

  • Added the same day at Bitquery's $13.51m of realised sale proceeds (low $13.22m USDC swapped to ETH, Lookonchain). Provisional: the stolen-key and breached-host account is the operator's own and unconfirmed; refunds are promised, not yet paid.

Cite this

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iTokenly Hack Registry, "Wagyu XMR1 deployer on Hyperliquid (November 2026) hack — November 2026", iTokenly, accessed 2026-11-21, https://itokenly.com/hacks/wagyu-xmr1-hyperliquid-november-2026
https://itokenly.com/hacks/wagyu-xmr1-hyperliquid-november-2026

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