T
iTokenly

Value DeFi (vStake pool) hack — May 2021

Verified — 3 sourcesLast checked August 1, 2026

Incident facts

Date of incident
Target typeOther
Loss$6,000,000Published estimates range $6,000,000 to $10,000,000Price at time of incident
MethodAccess control flawThe vStake profit-sharing pool contract had an initialize() function that was missing the line setting the initialized flag to true, so anyone could call it again. At 03:22 UTC the attacker re-initialized the pool, set the operator role to their own address and pointed the stake token at a dummy token, then called governanceRecoverUnsupported() to withdraw 10,839.16 vBSWAP/BUSD LP tokens. Removing that liquidity yielded 7,342.75 vBSWAP and 205,659.22 BUSD. The vBSWAP was sold for 8,790.77 BNB on 1inch, and the proceeds were used to buy renBTC and bridged to Bitcoin via renBridge. Value DeFi said the missing line came from human error when the code was merged from an older Reserve Fund implementation.
ChainsBNB Chain
OutcomeUnresolved

What happened

On 5 May 2021 at 03:22 UTC an attacker took over the vStake profit-sharing pool for the vBSWAP token on Value DeFi's BNB Chain deployment. The pool's initialize() function was missing the line that marks a contract as initialized, so it could be called a second time by anyone. The attacker re-initialized it, made themselves the operator, and then used the pool's own emergency recovery function to withdraw the staked LP tokens.

According to Value DeFi's post-mortem the attacker removed 10,839.16 vBSWAP/BUSD LP tokens, redeemed them for 7,342.75 vBSWAP and 205,659.22 BUSD, sold the vBSWAP for 8,790.77 BNB on 1inch, converted to renBTC and bridged the proceeds to Bitcoin. The team attributed the missing line to a merge error when the code was copied from an earlier Reserve Fund contract, said no other pool carried the flaw, and committed to a 12-hour timelock on critical functions and to buying cover from an insurance partner.

The dollar figure is disputed. The researcher Igor Igamberdiev, whose on-chain analysis was reported by CoinGape, valued this incident at about $6 million; The Defiant put it at $10 million. Value DeFi published no USD figure of its own. The gap reflects the difference between what the attacker realised on sale and the pre-attack market value of the tokens.

Value DeFi announced a compensation plan using 2,802.75 vBSWAP from its Reserve Fund plus the 205,659.22 BUSD, with a community vote on how to mint the remaining 4,540 vBSWAP. Two days later the same protocol lost a further sum in a separate exploit of its vSwap AMM pools. The stolen funds were not recovered.

Sources

  1. Value DeFiPrimary · retrieved 2026-08-01
  2. The DefiantSecondary · retrieved 2026-08-01
  3. CoinGapeSecondary · retrieved 2026-08-01

Official post-mortem: https://web.archive.org/web/20221007212356/http://medium.com/valuedefi/vstake-pool-incident-post-mortem-4550407c9714

Cite this

This data is published under CC BY 4.0. You may reuse it, including commercially, as long as you credit iTokenly and link back.

iTokenly Hack Registry, "Value DeFi (vStake pool) hack — May 2021", iTokenly, accessed 2026-08-01, https://itokenly.com/hacks/value-defi-vstake-pool
https://itokenly.com/hacks/value-defi-vstake-pool

Permalinks never change. If an entry is renamed, the old address keeps working.

Spotted an error? Write to [email protected]. Corrections to published figures are logged on this page. See the methodology for how entries are checked.