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Sovryn lending and margin on Rootstock (October 2026) hack — October 2026

Verified — 4 sourcesLast checked November 11, 2026

Incident facts

Date of incident
Publicly disclosedNovember 3, 2026
Target typeLending protocol
Loss$913,572As reported, basis unstated
MethodContract logic errorThe lending system did not verify actual token receipt: a malicious conversion route reported swap output that was accepted as collateral although the tokens never arrived, and real assets then left pooled lending custody against those records
ChainsOther
OutcomeUnresolved

What happened

Three transactions on 31 October 2026, at 08:34, 15:50 and 15:53 UTC, drained Sovryn's lending and margin contracts on Rootstock, the Bitcoin sidechain. The lending system failed to verify that tokens had actually arrived: a malicious conversion route reported swap output that the protocol accepted as collateral, and real assets then left the lending pools against it. Sovryn learned of it at 19:52 UTC and paused the core protocol at 20:10 UTC and the lending pools by 20:19 UTC.

Sovryn's reconciliation puts the attacker's net proceeds at 604,575.19 XUSD and 4.02606509 WRBTC, after the attacker's own starting capital. At the report's own valuation assumptions (XUSD at $0.995, BTC at $77,500; CoinGecko had BTC at about $77,275 that day) that is about $913,600, the headline here. A 24-hour withdrawal delay Sovryn had switched on five days earlier held seven further requests of 66,134 XUSD in escrow before they reached the attacker; they are excluded from the loss rather than counted as recovered. The unsupported loans and collateral the attack left behind overlap with this cash loss and are not added to it.

Lending, borrowing and margin trading remain halted while loans, collateral and pool balances are reconciled; Sovryn has not announced how losses will be allocated. A related attack on its XUSD/WRBTC AMM pool the next day is a separate entry, and Sovryn says it has not established that the same operator was behind both.

On-chain references

Published so the figures above can be checked against the chain rather than taken from us. Victim addresses are never listed.

Transactions

  • 0x355107e10fd887c7c7b433cf8d281035ae6c90a28d19e3c2e313ae81fd7e3c78
  • 0xf6c947194ef8b73bfa4cf1e8ec72dab47ed719e9d1ffb1f28269f0a84c80819b
  • 0xbde182addcb9cd4afdf834e88763f64c72c311518e4fe34ebd175e15d98203cb

Attacker addresses

  • 0x740a2ecba7c291473d88ed8ae7a310c3c32d8d4a
  • 0x643234de31619ded5496ba30d0b6b97791e959fd

Sources

  1. Sovryn incident report, 31 October–1 November 2026 (Sovryn forum, 3 November 2026)Primary · retrieved 2026-11-11
  2. Sovryn attack disclosure: BOB, Rootstock and Babelfish (Sovryn forum, dated 8 November 2026)Primary · retrieved 2026-11-11
  3. Rootstock Blockscout, first attack transaction (189,152.55 XUSD and 2.4166 WRBTC to the first-incident address)On-chain · retrieved 2026-11-11
  4. DefiLlama hacks, Sovryn Lend entryAggregator · retrieved 2026-11-11

Official post-mortem: https://forum.sovryn.com/t/3612

Changes to this entry

  • Added at Sovryn's reconciled net attacker proceeds, 604,575.19 XUSD + 4.026 WRBTC, at the report's $0.995 / $77,500 assumptions (= ~$914k in Sovryn's words). 66,134 XUSD held by the Perimeter delay is excluded, not recovered. Missed by the 2 Nov and 3 Nov sweeps; found via DefiLlama on 11 Nov. Our read of the first transaction matches the report.

Cite this

This data is published under CC BY 4.0. You may reuse it, including commercially, as long as you credit iTokenly and link back.

iTokenly Hack Registry, "Sovryn lending and margin on Rootstock (October 2026) hack — October 2026", iTokenly, accessed 2026-11-11, https://itokenly.com/hacks/sovryn-rootstock-lending-october-2026
https://itokenly.com/hacks/sovryn-rootstock-lending-october-2026

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