Sovryn XUSD/WRBTC AMM pool on Rootstock (November 2026) hack — November 2026
Incident facts
| Date of incident | |
|---|---|
| Publicly disclosed | November 3, 2026 |
| Target type | Decentralised exchange |
| Loss | $538,749As reported, basis unstated |
| Method | Contract logic errorAMM fee processing accepted an output number without matching delivery; real WRBTC moved from the pool to the protocol's fee collector, and the resulting reserve distortion let the attacker withdraw XUSD from the pool |
| Chains | Other |
| Outcome | Unresolved |
What happened
At 18:42:46 UTC on 1 November 2026, the day after its lending contracts were drained, Sovryn's XUSD/WRBTC AMM pool on Rootstock was exploited through a related flaw. The pool's fee processing accepted an output number without checking that the tokens were delivered: real WRBTC moved from the pool to the protocol's own fee collector, and the distorted reserves let the attacker take a large XUSD withdrawal. The lending pause then in force did not cover AMM swaps, fee collection or Zero redemptions.
The transaction paid 541,455.998 XUSD to the attacker, which we confirmed from its token transfers; at the $0.995 XUSD price Sovryn uses that is $538,749, the headline here. The pool's net custody fell by about 542,184 XUSD and 6.646 WRBTC, but Sovryn says about 6.639 RBTC of that is pool principal still in protocol custody, so it is not counted as stolen. The proceeds were converted through DLLR and ZUSD and bridged out within the hour, including 5.1 BTC paid out on Bitcoin and about 0.136 ETH; those are the same proceeds, not further losses.
Sovryn changed the fee controls by 20:42 UTC, delisted the pool on 2 November and halted the AMM's affected routes and the Zero protocol through SIP-0097 on 7 November. Nothing has been returned and LP losses are still being reconciled. A separate extraction of 69,381 XUSD from Babelfish's reward inventory on 4 November is below this registry's threshold.
On-chain references
Published so the figures above can be checked against the chain rather than taken from us. Victim addresses are never listed.
Transactions
- 0x20c7d741b844a08d5d5190b49ad2651f29a0eca5f7dad6d1b4dc9228a009762f
Attacker addresses
- 0x101d1dc6e2164d6091ace64701e301f4535665ba
- bc1qtzt5vy5qssteyn2ky7u472754a8jgtx9cxzs9m
Sources
- Sovryn incident report, 31 October–1 November 2026 (Sovryn forum, 3 November 2026)Primary · retrieved 2026-11-11
- Sovryn attack disclosure: BOB, Rootstock and Babelfish (Sovryn forum, dated 8 November 2026)Primary · retrieved 2026-11-11
- Rootstock Blockscout, AMM attack transaction (541,455.998 XUSD to the attacker)On-chain · retrieved 2026-11-11
- DefiLlama hacks, Sovryn Dex entryAggregator · retrieved 2026-11-11
Official post-mortem: https://forum.sovryn.com/t/3612
Changes to this entry
- Added at the 541,455.998 XUSD payment to the attacker (confirmed from the transaction's token transfers) at Sovryn's $0.995. The ~6.64 RBTC of pool principal in protocol custody is not counted as stolen. Missed by the 2 Nov and 3 Nov sweeps; found via DefiLlama on 11 Nov.
Cite this
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iTokenly Hack Registry, "Sovryn XUSD/WRBTC AMM pool on Rootstock (November 2026) hack — November 2026", iTokenly, accessed 2026-11-11, https://itokenly.com/hacks/sovryn-rootstock-amm-november-2026https://itokenly.com/hacks/sovryn-rootstock-amm-november-2026Permalinks never change. If an entry is renamed, the old address keeps working.
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