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Polymarket front end via DebugBear script (October 2026) hack — October 2026

Verified — 6 sourcesLast checked October 29, 2026

Incident facts

Date of incident
Publicly disclosedOctober 29, 2026
Target typeOther
Loss$2,654,211Price at time of incident
MethodSupply chain or frontend compromiseA compromised third-party web-performance monitoring script (DebugBear’s real-user monitoring embed) loaded on Polymarket.com showed users a valid-looking transaction while having them sign a different one
ChainsPolygon
OutcomeUnresolved

What happened

On 29 October 2026 users of Polymarket.com, the prediction market’s international site, began reporting in its Discord that funds were leaving their accounts without permission. At 18:00 UTC DebugBear, a company that sells web-performance monitoring, said it was affected by an ongoing security incident and told customers of its real-user monitoring product to remove its embed code from their websites. Polymarket loaded that script. Six minutes later Polymarket put the exchange into cancel-only mode and paused relayer actions.

At 18:33 UTC Polymarket said one of its third-party providers had been compromised, that the issue was fixed, that it had referred the matter to law enforcement and that anyone affected would be made whole. Trading reopened at about 19:00 UTC, with Polymarket saying it was fully reimbursing all affected traders. Changpeng Zhao described the mechanism as a front-end injection that put an incorrect transaction in front of users while showing them a valid one to sign; 0xngmi of DefiLlama said wallet seed phrases were not exposed.

The analyst Conor Grogan counted 995 drained accounts and $2,654,211.42 at the attacker’s address, with the largest single losses at about $341,000 and $307,000, and said the attacker had converted everything to POL, most likely to avoid stablecoin freezes. 0xngmi tracked about $2.7 million. This is Polymarket’s second front-end supply-chain incident of 2026, after the vendor compromise of June. Reimbursement had been promised but not confirmed as paid on the day of recording.

Sources

  1. Polymarket on X (29 October 2026)Primary · retrieved 2026-10-29
  2. Polymarket on X: trading back online, reimbursing affected traders (29 October 2026)Primary · retrieved 2026-10-29
  3. DebugBear on X (29 October 2026)Primary · retrieved 2026-10-29
  4. Conor Grogan on X (29 October 2026)Secondary · retrieved 2026-10-29
  5. 0xngmi (DefiLlama) on X (29 October 2026)Secondary · retrieved 2026-10-29
  6. Bitcoin.com News (29 October 2026)Secondary · retrieved 2026-10-29

Changes to this entry

  • Recorded the day of the incident at Conor Grogan’s count of the attacker address; 0xngmi’s $2.7m is the upper end. Revisit when reimbursement is confirmed.

Cite this

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iTokenly Hack Registry, "Polymarket front end via DebugBear script (October 2026) hack — October 2026", iTokenly, accessed 2026-10-29, https://itokenly.com/hacks/polymarket-debugbear-october-2026
https://itokenly.com/hacks/polymarket-debugbear-october-2026

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