T
iTokenly

PancakeSwap OLPC/LABUBI liquidity pool hack — June 2026

Verified — 4 sourcesLast checked August 1, 2026

Incident facts

Date of incident
Publicly disclosedJune 20, 2026
Target typeDecentralised exchange
Loss$1,115,904Published estimates range $960,000 to $1,115,904Price at time of incident
MethodContract logic errorThe OLPC token contract treated transfers initiated by the PancakeSwap V2 pair as buys and burned the transferred amount multiplied by a stored `decimalsValue` parameter while delivering zero tokens. Repeated calls to the permissionless skim() and sync() functions forced pair-originated transfers, collapsing the OLPC side of the reserves from about 51.93 million to a fraction of a token while the much smaller LABUBI burn left that side of the pool comparatively untouched; the resulting mispricing let a small amount of OLPC be swapped for the LABUBI reserve and converted to USDT.
ChainsBNB Chain
OutcomeUnresolved

What happened

On 20 June 2026 the OLPC/LABUBI liquidity pool on PancakeSwap V2, on BNB Chain, was drained of roughly $1.1 million. OLPC's transfer logic treated transfers initiated by the pair contract itself as buy transactions and burned the transferred amount multiplied by a stored parameter, sending nothing to the recipient. Because PancakeSwap's skim() and sync() functions can be called by anyone, the attacker was able to force pair-originated transfers repeatedly, collapsing the OLPC side of the pool's reserves from about 51.93 million tokens to a fraction of a token. A far smaller quantity of LABUBI, about 124,000 tokens, was burned in the same sequence, leaving that side of the pool comparatively intact. The pool then priced LABUBI against almost no OLPC, and a small swap took the LABUBI reserve, which was routed through LABUBI/WBNB and WBNB/USDT and converted to USDT. Olympix, which analysed the transactions, put the take at 1,115,903.66 USDT in block 105326393 at 11:31 UTC after twenty skim() and twenty-one sync() calls, and identified the attacker. The Crypto Times, citing PeckShield, reported that the proceeds were bridged to Ethereum, converted into 633.4 ETH and deposited into Tornado Cash; it also put the attacker's net gain at about $960,000, against the roughly $1.12 million removed from the pool. Published figures otherwise cluster at about $1.1 million. DEXTools reported that the burn multiplier in the OLPC contract had been raised from 1 to 7,326,680,472,586,200,649 about 46 days before the drain, after which ownership was renounced, making the setting permanent. It described the configuration as looking premeditated. No party has been named and no charges have been brought, so this is recorded as an exploit of the token's transfer logic rather than an established insider act.

On-chain references

Published so the figures above can be checked against the chain rather than taken from us. Victim addresses are never listed.

Attacker addresses

  • 0x18d6c39ae9e537f948aa2212d44d8c23944fc188

Sources

  1. OlympixOn-chain · retrieved 2026-08-01
  2. DEXToolsSecondary · retrieved 2026-08-01
  3. AMBCryptoSecondary · retrieved 2026-08-01
  4. The Crypto TimesSecondary · retrieved 2026-08-01

Cite this

This data is published under CC BY 4.0. You may reuse it, including commercially, as long as you credit iTokenly and link back.

iTokenly Hack Registry, "PancakeSwap OLPC/LABUBI liquidity pool hack — June 2026", iTokenly, accessed 2026-08-01, https://itokenly.com/hacks/olpc-labubi-pancakeswap-pool
https://itokenly.com/hacks/olpc-labubi-pancakeswap-pool

Permalinks never change. If an entry is renamed, the old address keeps working.

Spotted an error? Write to [email protected]. Corrections to published figures are logged on this page. See the methodology for how entries are checked.