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Keplr social-login wallets via Web3Auth (November 2026) hack — November 2026

Verified — 4 sourcesLast checked November 18, 2026

Incident facts

Date of incident
Publicly disclosedNovember 7, 2026
Target typeWallet software or provider
Loss$1,820,000Price at time of incident
MethodInfrastructure compromiseKeplr attributes the breach to a vulnerability in the infrastructure of Web3Auth, which runs its Google and Apple social login, that exposed the private keys of some social-login wallets; the attacker signed transfers and bridge requests with victims' own keys
ChainsOther, Ethereum
OutcomeUnresolved

What happened

From 17:13 UTC on 1 November 2026 an attacker emptied Keplr wallets that had been created with Google or Apple login. Keplr, a wallet for the Cosmos family of blockchains, said on 7 November that a vulnerability in the infrastructure of Web3Auth, the company that runs its social login, had led to a private key breach for some of those users; wallets created with a recovery phrase or a hardware wallet were not affected. The attacker signed transfers with the victims' own keys and bridged much of the money to Ethereum, $568,000 of it through Squid bridge requests.

Bitquery traced at least $1.82 million taken by the attacker between 1 and 12 November from 7,842 Cosmos wallets, 52 Ethereum wallets and 13 Hyperliquid accounts, counting each coin once on the chain where it left its owner and pricing everything at one moment on 7 November (the figure here, a floor: the attacker was still active when the count stopped). The largest single loss was 167,462 USDC from one Hyperliquid account. About $1.01 million was gone before Web3Auth began its response on the evening of 6 November.

From then Web3Auth and its partners ran what they call whitehat recovery, moving about $6.0 million from vulnerable wallets that had not yet been drained into recovery addresses it has listed publicly; it says those funds are held safely and that a return process will follow. Those moves are not counted as theft here, and the rescued funds are not counted as recovered, since they were never stolen. Neither company has said whether victims of the actual theft will be compensated.

Sources

  1. Keplr on X (7 November 2026)Primary · retrieved 2026-11-18
  2. Web3Auth on X: whitehat recovery (7 November 2026)Primary · retrieved 2026-11-18
  3. Web3Auth on X: recovery wallets list (10 November 2026)Primary · retrieved 2026-11-18
  4. Bitquery investigation, third version (12 November 2026)Secondary · retrieved 2026-11-18

Changes to this entry

  • Added at Bitquery's floor of $1.82m stolen (third version of its report, 12 Nov), which separates the attacker's addresses from Web3Auth's published recovery wallets. The earlier $6.01m figure (Bitquery v1, SlowMist) was Web3Auth's rescue, not theft, and is not used; the rescued ~$6.0m is not counted as recovered. Raise if Keplr/Web3Auth publish a stolen total.
  • Low end set to $1.01m, the part Bitquery counts as taken before Web3Auth's rescue began (6 Nov). Checked: Bitquery's attacker address list does not overlap Web3Auth's published recovery wallets (osmo1atuap9…, inj1lqmdm…, 0x413e4F4D… are listed separately as recovery wallets).

Cite this

This data is published under CC BY 4.0. You may reuse it, including commercially, as long as you credit iTokenly and link back.

iTokenly Hack Registry, "Keplr social-login wallets via Web3Auth (November 2026) hack — November 2026", iTokenly, accessed 2026-11-18, https://itokenly.com/hacks/keplr-web3auth-social-login-november-2026
https://itokenly.com/hacks/keplr-web3auth-social-login-november-2026

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